Caspian Room 4-53

May 8 Interview of Ian Rushby | Jeff Heller, Bill Bonse, Stephanie Moore & Rudy Blyweert

Bill: Introduction

Jeff: Introduction on why we are doing this, lack of privilege.

Bonse: Q: Two gHSSEr audits. Iain Conn had not seen. Why are these not received?

Ian: Process of gHSSEr audits around since late 1990's. One of requirements, every 3 years, independent review of management at a site to create compliance pressure. When I took over IA, Mogford had HSSE, and we were both aware it was not working as intended. The accountability was at the line. Coleman took over for Mogford. Tried to consistently apply gHSSEr--line had accountability, program decided who was examined; had high level person do audits. IA provided some resources. At end of 2003, the leverage of audit saved on quality of audit team and seriousness of those involved. So, we decided to go through all the audits, this coined the phrase "tolerance of non-compliance." Tony H. said he didn't understand why I was worried because he looked at his personal safety results.

When TXC happened, I spoke to PB2, I said shocked but not surprised because refineries have created their own cultures similar to Alaska. They didn't need procedures, had been there for a long time. Unmanageable. In 2004, we looked at Whiting and Bulwer Island--both said local culture evolved, no external view on compliance. "We know what is right." So, a locally driven process that was not really fit can cause issues.

I talked to JAM about driving standard. He told story about people at Whiting not wearing seat belts--half of Whiting did not comply.... So, if we shut things down for not following rules, then we'd shut down a lot.

Rudy: Q: Was it worse at TXC?

Ian: Anecdotally, yet it was. Discipline, hard to pin it on those in charge if they inherited the negligence of others. Look at right things and look in right way--usually if you get that right, you're o.k. So you go back and see, did you understand these risks? If you didn't respond, did you understand the risks. So did we see things? Did we not even go to look?

Bill: Q: Get any warnings about TXC?

Ian: I don't recall anyone saying any specific warnings. Have we really gotten down to the root causes here? Not enough to say accountabilities are not clear. We also have a tendency with gHSSEr and other things to make too many recommendations. I am frustrated by this. The big change we are doing with Jim O'Brien on Mogford's team--professional auditors who will do this. Part of monitoring under the Green Book. Part of the issue was Coleman's HSSE organization did not have respect of segment organization. But Coleman had trouble trying to get sites to cross reference follow-up actions. Before 2003 and before Green Book, I could only influence the segments indirectly, so there was not consistency. Different teams everywhere had different approaches.

Rudy: Q: Some confusion on how all of these audits came on line.

Ian: S. Houston was an example of one that did not do it the way I wanted it.

Quite recently I had conversation with Sue Rataj and Chris--to find out what was discussed in the documents that segment saw and then EJPB. So Sue R might have this. It is fair to say the 2003 review had little impact in the organization. On integrity management, we saw a lack of consistency in applying it.

From 2004, my report to the EEAC -- minutes -- are pretty thin. We should check EEAC records.