

**INTERVIEW OF MARTIN RISINGER
TAKEN ON JULY 11, 2006
LANCASTER HOTEL
HOUSTON, TEXAS**

Interviewers: Rudy Blyweert and Stephanie Moore

Introductory comments: Context, interview confidential but not privileged.

Career

Marine Corps for a couple of years

1976: Joined Amoco Oil in TXC (family members had previously worked there; also bias for an American company)

1980: Promoted to supervisor

1983: Returned to operator to work on new projects

1985: Worked in the Instrument and Technical Group (move from pneumatics to computers)

1986: Supervisor, Pipe Sills

1989: Returned to work on cokers at request of division manager

1996: Ultracracker, West Plant (up until now had worked primarily on East Plant); again focused on reliability

1999: HIPRO implemented (impact: Outside operators were focused on mechanical; Board Operators reported to Optimization Engineer) until then, Chief Operators had run a tight ship. HIPRO resulted in a lot of confusion. Board operators did not report to supervisors, he reported to the optimization team. As such, he did not need to listen to the outside operator

2001: Superintendent of AUR/ISOM/ARUs; built NDU and brought it on line. Not much OT; had one turnaround; did not have staffing issues

April 2003: Turnaround Superintendent works for Mike Gibson, responsible for coordinating the work on the turnarounds; isolate the work; do all of the mechanical work; assist in bringing it up mechanically); typically lasts for 14 -28 days

About . . .

Step Ups: He had been in maintenance; Charlie Logan knew units well

March 23 Incident: Classic case of 'holes in swiss cheese all lined up'; very abnormal; people tried to do the right thing; everything went wrong; very complicated because of the shut downs that were going on; too many simple warning steps missed

State of Units: Felt that leaders had become too lax in following positive discipline; need a better screening process for supervisors – may be fair, though may not get the right person in job.

Amoco did have formal training programs for managers.

Briggs: Focused on himself; 'if you're on fire, he would not put it out'; reported to Optimization Engineer

Turnarounds: Gap between TAR superintendent and Project manager should have all been under his control ; case of two people being in charge; makes for unclear command of control; role of SPA (Mark Richard) was to be an Operations representative , did not have authority over turnaround inclusive of concept to sign off; worked very closely with Andy McWilliams

For older units, operators are the control assurance to prevent accidents from happening
Handover to Ray: He had everything in computer folders, e.g. people, plants, units; liked Ray but job was too much for him, too much on plate to pay attention to detail; Ray did not have formal training

Mogford report: Step ups were very common; board guy does not report to Asset

Board Operator: Job is very boring; now becomes even more distracted by Internet

Trailing Siting: Turnaround teams put together plot plans; turnaround trailers were primarily for tools; trailers were not the cause not the effect. We must eliminate the cause. Fluor trailer was for the motor project, not the TAR.

TXC today: Running at 50% of capacity; working on Tier 2 start ups; Colin wants to do what's right; not just talk – lots of action; turnarounds cost 4X due to logistics . Has a good team however still a few "old" guys who better is replaced.

TXC state of disrepair: Good old boy network of engineering managers coming from same school beginning with Dick Evans; funds continually cut and less people to do the work; by the time BP bought TXC, facility was in pretty bad shape (lots of 'jump over' to continue operations and manage around risks)

Concluding requests . . .

1. Include capital projects as a part of the turnaround projects (would clarify chain of command and manage gaps)
2. Get explosion proof housing for site so that turnaround team can do their work properly