

**INTERVIEW SUMMARY OF PAT GOWER
TAKEN ON APRIL 27, 2006
AT CANTERA III, WARRENVILLE, ILLINOIS**

On April 27, 2006, the Management Accountability Team interviewed Pat Gower, Vice President North America Refining. The participating team members were Bill Bonse, Rudy Blyweert, Stephanie Moore and Jeff Heller. Bill Bonse was the primary interviewer. The interview lasted approximately four hours. Margene Westlund took minutes of the interview. Margene Westlund prepared the interview summary. Mr. Gower has not reviewed this summary.

Mr. Bonse gave an introduction regarding the scope of the interview.

Mr. Heller informed Mr. Gower on the legal standard and that this interview will not necessarily be covered under attorney-client privilege. Mr. Gower was also told that any and all notes relating to this interview, including this document, could be produced in potential litigation.

INTERVIEW:

A. General View of March 2005 Explosion

In response to a general overview question, Mr. Gower stated that the Mogford Report describes the root causes of the explosion. Even prior to BP, culture at Texas City ("TXC") concerning operations was a problem.

B. Mr. Gower's Employment Background/Relationship with Parus

From 1982 to 1988, Mr. Gower was a supervisor of the Docks, CAT3, and Pipestill. There was very little discipline in two out of the three units. Mr. Gower had to replace many people because of the failure to hold people accountable. It was a cultural challenge at the Docks. CAT 3 was better. Pipestill had the same cultural issues as the Docks. The supervisors did not hold employees accountable. TXC has always had issues. Performance falls to lowest level unless management intervenes.

TXC does not have good relations with the union, even though there is a very strong contract with a great management rights clause. The union is fairly militant and has not had a strong union leader.

After that, Mr. Gower went to Mandan, North Dakota which had a solid operating discipline. After the merger, BP tried to do the star site concept at TXC and it was difficult across all businesses. Mr. Gower commented that the site concept does not work. The Chemical plant and Refinery were run separately. Union contracts were similar, but the work environment was different. It was a real challenge to run TXC as a

star site. It did not focus on the operations. Mr. Gower was never on the site board. From 2001-2004, the site director reported to the site board. This complicated the governance structure.

In October or November 2004, Mr. Parus began working for Mr. Gower. Rick Hale was the Refinery BUL—Commercial Account and was accountable to Mr. Parus for HSSE and Operations, but reported to Mr. Gower on commercial side. Mr. Parus was still the Site Director when Mr. Hale left in June 2004. Mr. Parus did not transition into the Refinery BUL until later. The old star concept was abolished, but Mr. Parus never created new structure.

In 2004, Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Gower met with Mr. Parus to get an operations manager. Kathleen Lucas was brought in as the operations manager. Mr. Parus did not want Ms. Lucas' position because he wanted everyone reporting to him. That position was essentially a span breaker position. No direct access to the boss, which is what Mr. Parus liked to have.

In the late 90's, there was a lot done to improve relations with the union. Mr. Gower discussed the process with the FMCS. After the merger, non Amoco were people brought in, including an MDL who came from upstream.

In 1999, Mr. Gower went to TXC for one year as a manager of Maintenance, Engineering and Turnaround for both chemical and refining. TXC was not a star site at that time. Maintenance in the late 90's was tightly controlled and had been reduced pretty substantially. For example, the grass was not cut as often. Mr. Gower was told to reduce the budgets. After that, Mr. Gower went to Green Lake as plant manager. Star site at TXC was implemented after Mr. Gower left. Tim Scruggs was the BUL and then became Site Director. When Mr. Hoffman became GVP, Mr. Scruggs was transferred to Carson.

Mr. Gower met Mr. Parus in the 1980s when he was a Superintendent at TXC. They met in Naperville while taking a class on business processes for superintendents. Mr. Parus was a Superintendent at the Cat Cracker in Whiting.

The next time Mr. Gower saw Mr. Parus was when Dick Evans was VP US Refining. Mr. Parus was a Results Management Coordinator and he pulled data for Mr. Evans. Mr. Parus would travel to the sites gathering data. Mr. Parus came to Mandan when Mr. Gower was there. Mr. Parus eventually went to Pipelines—he was the General Manager of either the Crude or Products side of the business. Mr. Parus then went to Yorktown prior to the merger. Mr. Gower was in chemicals. Mr. Parus then went to London and had non-operating sites and procurement for R&M. After that, Mr. Parus went to TXC.

In late 2003, Mr. Gower moved to Toledo and Mr. Parus went to TXC. Mr. Gower had nothing to do with TXC during that time. Mr. Hoffman eventually asked his BULs if they wanted a manager over them. They said yes, and Mr. Gower then became US VP of Refining. Mr. Parus was a band C and Mr. Gower was a band D at that time. In the US,

Mr. Gower handles the performance review of the refinery BULs, and otherwise seeks to use his influence with them. Mr. Hoffman holds the performance contracts for BULs. Colin Maclean does not report to Mr. Gower or Mr. Hoffman, he reports to John Browne. Mr. Gower gives him advice, etc.

C. TXC Environment

When Mr. Parus came to TXC, there were multiple sites and businesses, and he worked on a couple of areas to make changes. Mr. Parus picked a couple of teams to make a marked improvement. Personal safety was one of those areas. The 1000 day goals originated from Mr. Parus. Environmental performance was a way to accomplish this for integrated sites.

Mr. Parus asked for more money (17% increase) to put a South Houston Infrastructure Team together. Mr. Gower is not sure Mr. Parus knew how bad his culture was. The AT Kearney Report was done after Mr. Parus was there.

In early 2004, Mr. Hoffman asked for help on his business model and asked for three volunteers. Mr. Hoffman volunteered Mr. Gower to look at his structure and how they govern. Mr. Hoffman created a Regional VP position and placed Mr. Gower in that position. Mr. Gower did performance evaluations, QPRs and raises for the BULs. Mr. Hoffman holds the business contracts. Mr. Hoffman asked Mr. Gower to do performance discussions with Mr. Parus even though he did not report to Mr. Gower. Mr. Parus did not report to Mr. Gower until late 2004. Before that, Mr. Hoffman did his review. Refining sponsored the TXC Star Site (SHIS). Chemicals had three BULs. In sum, Mr. Gower held the personal performance contract and Mr. Hoffman held the business contract. Mr. Hoffman approves both.

In 2005, Innovene becomes a reality and the star site concept was largely abandoned by that time. Mr. Parus is now a Refinery Manager and reports to Mr. Gower. Mr. Parus began reporting to Mr. Gower in late 2004, early 2005. Before October 2004, Mr. Parus reported to Mr. Hoffman. In 2005, Mr. Gower did Mr. Parus' personal contract and Mr. Hoffman held the BU contract.

The two major incidents that occurred in 2004 were not in the 2005 Performance Contract because Mr. Parus did not work for Mr. Gower. It is Mr. Gower's understanding that Mr. Parus was called into Mr. Manzoni's office. Mr. Parus agreed to do the "just culture" model at TXC. Mr. Parus was committed to verify and check valves, look at isolation, review lock out/tag out procedures, etc. and take corrective action. Mr. Gower was not aware of the Telos Report until later. Mr. Gower reviewed Mr. Hale because he was commercially linked to Mr. Gower.

D. Broken Windows Project

This project was based on a book. The purpose was to come up with a project to fix the visible things around the refinery and to get pride back in the site. Broken Windows may

have addressed culture. March 23 did not occur because of budget restraints. It was a cultural problem. Mr. Gower stated that perhaps we did not intervene enough.

Mr. Bonse cited to Mr. Parus' e-mail dated a week before the March 23, 2005 explosion that does not mention the 2004 explosion or anything else. The e-mail congratulates Mr. Parus on the safety culture. Mr. Gower never saw this e-mail. Mr. Bonse thinks this e-mail reflects the Refinery culture.

Mr. Parus created an auditing team to go around the refinery to audit practices and procedures. Mr. Gower thinks Mr. Parus was trying to be a cheerleader with a positive view. Mr. Parus was impacted emotionally by the fatalities. Mr. Parus also spoke at a conference. Mr. Gower was not included in any conversations that Mr. Manzoni had with Mr. Parus about the 2004 incidents.

E. Safety

In late 2004, Mr. Gower brought the BULs together regarding safety. He hired a behavioral specialist. TXC pushed back because it was already doing Telos, using gHSSer protocol at the time. However, Mr. Gower was not aware of that. Cherry Point took the approach that Mr. Gower recommended. This was based on the same thing that Mr. Gower did when he investigated the Chocolate Bayou deaths. Mr. Gower had the same consultant. Eventually, Mr. Gower's consultant worked on the Stanley Report. TXC did not do the things that Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Gower wanted. HRO was an example of that. The consultant was also used in Green Lake and Toledo, but she had not gotten through TXC before the 3/23 incident happened.

Mr. Parus thought the 1000 day goals were working. TXC gave Mr. Gower lip service. Mr. Gower had some uneasy feelings. Mr. Gower was originally a band D as Refining VP and Mr. Parus was a band C. Mr. Parus and Mr. Hale had performance issues between them. When Mr. Gower picked up Mr. Parus in 2005, he started paying more attention. Mr. Hale later moved to Corryton. Mr. Hale was glad to leave.

In late 2004, early 2005, Mr. Parus started coming to the BUL meetings. The technology guy (Hugh) told Mr. Gower that Mr. Parus lied to him and that Mr. Parus was totally disconnected. Hugh's comments were based on what he saw at the plant. Mr. Gower believes that Mr. Parus was disconnected from the refinery.

Mr. Gower thinks that the fire department logs in their time. Mr. Gower does not think the Refinery reports all fires, unless maybe an extinguisher is used. But, all fires should be logged.

F. Mr. Parus' Performance

Mr. Gower wanted Ms. Lucas because she brought another view to the table. In late 2004, Mr. Gower told Mr. Hoffman that Mr. Parus was the weakest band C employee that he is responsible for and he is running the biggest refinery. Mr. Gower got into a

debate about bringing Ms. Lucas on board. Mr. Gower asked Mr. Parus multiple times to prepare a Site Governance Plan. Mr. Gower finally received a draft after the 3/23 incident. Mr. Parus had prepared it in February.

Mr. Bonse asked Mr. Gower what Mr. Parus' performance score was. Mr. Hoffman did the scores and Mr. Gower did the input. Mr. Gower discussed the fatalities and other things, but had no input on his scores. Mr. Parus worked for Mr. Gower approximately 83 days before the explosion. Mr. Gower does not have the authority to fire a group leader. Mr. Gower can tell Mr. Hoffman he is having a problem and ask for a new BUL. Mr. Gower put a BUL on a performance improvement plan ("PIP").

The commercial side reported to Mr. Gower. TXC was complex and it could not hit performance contracts. The site should have been reconfigured. In 2004, as VP Refining, Mr. Gower discussed with Mr. Hoffman and put a team together to see what could be done to the commercial side. This was a six month study initially led by Mr. Gebhart and Willie Willis. Mr. Parus did not hamper this study. Terri Harlan (Choc. Bayou), Rick Hale (TXC) and the person at Pasadena reported to Mr. Parus. In 2003, Mr. Parus was the boss. In 2004, Mr. Hale would say he had two bosses (Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Gower) and Mr. Parus would say that Mr. Hale reported to him.

G. TXC /Refinery Managers/BULs

Tim Scruggs—BUL at TXC

Tim Scruggs-- becomes Site Director at TXC when the start site concept was introduced.

Ashok Jhawar –BUL at Pasadena reporting to Mr. Parus.

Jeanne Johns—commercial job at TXC

Al Kozinski—Refining VP

Rick Hale—BUL at TXC reporting to Mr. Parus and later to both Mr. Parus and Mr. Gower.

H. March 23 Incident/Weak Culture

It is a cultural thing. First level leaders have not been held accountable. Warren Briggs was on the board and he was not a good operator. Andy Tenhaaf was sitting at a local satellite control board and continued to let Mr. Briggs make mistakes. After several mistakes, Mr. Tenhaaf asked Mr. Briggs what he was doing, but he never intervened to do it the right way until it was too late. There is only one tower so they think this is an easy start-up. There is complacency for start-up procedures. Mr. Gower cannot believe there is no sign off on start-up procedures. Procedures were followed in the 1980s. George Carter was requested to follow procedures. Brad Dalton was an operator in the 1980s. Mr. Dalton is now a level H. Mr. Dalton could tell Mr. Gower which operating discipline had rigor and which ones did not. ISOM had a weak culture.

After the accident, Mr. Gower went to TXC to start an investigative team. Mr. Gower later handed the reins over to Mr. Mogford. Mr. Gower saw enough of ISOM and asked

himself if everything is like this. He wrote the Stanley report for this purpose. The team came back and said there are the same issues in about four areas but to varying degrees. TXC culture falls back to the lowest denominator of accountability. You have to learn from failures. TXC has a "can do" attitude, but never finishes anything. Mr. Parus tried to stay focused with bold goals, but did not look at the right culture and safety. Mr. Parus picked the wrong things to focus on. Mr. Parus grew up with Amoco and its process safety. When the merger came, process safety was well managed because this was an Amoco site. Mr. Gower believes that Mr. Parus thought that process safety was being handled. Mr. Parus had personal safety incidents where a couple of people were killed so he focused on personal safety vs. process safety.

Mr. Parus buried Bill Ralph when he brought in Norine Stein. Mr. Ralph could not get Mr. Parus or Ms. Stein to pay attention. Mr. Parus would tell Mr. Ralph that it was not his problem, but he never called Mr. Gower like other BULs did. Mr. Ralph did not have access to management. Supervisors come out of the ranks without any real training. There used to be a CORE training program, but it is not done anymore. Mr. Gower thinks it is hard for those guys.

Mr. Gower made the statement, how could Warren Briggs stay a board operator? BP could disqualify him. The Board Operator position is not a sought after position because employees do not want to sit at the control panel. To bid on a board job, persons nominate themselves and are then selected based on seniority. This job requires a lot of responsibility and is a dedicated job. Mr. Gower has been told that Mr. Briggs is not a good operator, but it takes time to remove an operator.

Mike Hoffman is the best boss, clear directions, metrics. But, Mr. Hoffman does not like personnel discussions. Mr. Hoffman provides leadership and direction. Mr. Gower is not sure the issues with Mr. Parus were clear. Mr. Gower now receives reports on everything going on in refining. Mr. Gower did not get those prior to the March 23 incident.

The leadership team at TXC would go to a unit that they picked and conduct a deep dive review. Mr. Parus' leadership team was very large (approximately 17-24 people). Mr. Parus included the MDL, which undercut Ms. Lucas.

Mr. Tenhaaf said there was a lot of confusion on his roles and responsibilities that day. Mr. Tenhaaf claims he was stepped up from his operator role to get lunch. Operators were not interviewed. Outside operators would say Mr. Tenhaaf was running the start-up from the satellite control room. Mr. Tenhaaf was observing the board operator and directing the outside crew. Mr. Gower stated that a step-up should have provided leadership and direction because there were two new operators on the crew.

Mr. Gower is not sure who ordered the start-up. It started around midnight, but there was no pressing need to start because there was nothing for ISOM to feed it to. Mr. Gower thinks Mr. Adams just decided to start it up to get one piece out of the way.

I. Trailers

Mr. Bonse asked how long the Merritt trailers had been there? Mr. Gower responded that the trailers have been in that area for over two years. They are 150 feet away and no one saw the risk. There is a rule on flares, but not on stacks. MOC is still an issue. Some say that Bill Ralph gave permission to use the trailer. This was considered a free burn area. The catalyst warehouse was there.

J. Disciplines Resulting from 3/25

The fatalities investigation was run separately. Mr. Gower sent Mr. Parus home and put Ms. Lucas in charge as the acting BUL until they could bring someone else in. Mr. Gower was the relationship manager between BP and the agencies.

Ms. Lucas was in charge of the disciplinary process. She ran her own interviews and made recommendations to Mr. Gower. Ms. Lucas went much broader on discipline than Mr. Gower thought. Mr. Gower would have fired Mr. Briggs, given a DML to Mr. Tenhaaf and a warning to Mr. Adams. Ms. Lucas fired Mr. Adams because he said you don't need start-up procedures. Mr. Gower finally agreed. Ms. Lucas did not want to fire Operations Supervisor Scott Yerrell because he was not there. Mr. Gower pushed Ms. Lucas on this and she eventually agreed. Mr. Yerrell failed to do his job by not doing a pre start-up review. He did not set up the site with clear accountability. BP could not find the procedures and Mr. Yerrell had the start-up procedures in his briefcase since the night of the accident. When Mr. Gower looked at the procedures, it looked like they were pencil whipped. Gary Schultz said he was told "catch up" the procedures. Accordingly, Mr. Gower put pressure on Ms. Lucas about Mr. Yerrell. Not sure what Mr. Davidson did, but he did not follow procedures and it was Ms. Lucas' decision. Ms. Lucas terminated Charles Logan for an ISOM procedure.

Willie Willis had three fatalities in his area in one year. Mr. Gower stated he should have been fired. Mr. Willis had ISOM for at least six months. Prior to that, it was under Richard Peltier. Mr. Willis put a team together to look at roles and accountabilities. Mr. Willis was coaching and counseling and some say he was making a difference. He was a strong leader, but not a strong manager. Mr. Willis did not see that balance with management side regarding processes. Others thought Mr. Willis was a strong leader and MDL. Based on that advice, no discipline was taken. Mr. Parus felt that they skipped Mr. Willis.

Mr. Hawkins had different accountabilities. Mr. Hawkins had no oversight. Ms. Lucas thought Mr. Willis was doing a good job. Mr. Gower gave Ms. Lucas a pass. Mr. Gower does not see Mr. Hawkins as a strong leader—he is an average supervisor at best. Mr. Gower was surprised that Mr. Hawkins was a superintendent when he came back.

With regard to Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Blyweert asked what about Mr. Briggs, trailers, no signing-off procedures, he was there on March 22 and before. Mr. Gower stated that Mr. Hawkins did not have responsibility outside the ISOM and ARU box. Trailers were outside of his responsibility. That is how TXC worked.

Mr. Blyweert stated that handovers were not done properly. Mr. Gower responded that this is an historic TXC problem. Mr. Yerrell was injured playing sports. Mr. Yerrell claims that he told someone he was leaving the plant. But, Mr. Yerrell did not review procedures or hand off anything before he left.

The Stanley Report: Four units were checked. Was this just a West Plant problem or were there more systemic issues for failing to follow procedures. People were sent home within a week after the 3/25 incident for not following procedures. There were TVs everywhere. There is a TV studio at TXC. Mr. Gower heard that people had set up antennas. Mr. Gower was told that Mr. Briggs was up on the roof at the time of the incident adjusting the antenna.

K. Mr. Hoffman's Relationship with Mr. Willis/MDL Job Posting

Mr. Hoffman had authority over all level E employees and above. If Mr. Willis (level E) was disciplined, that would require Mr. Hoffman's approval. Mr. Hoffman said if Mr. Willis was disciplined, he would not step in. Some think that Mr. Hoffman is close to Mr. Willis. Mr. Hoffman would say "no". According to Mr. Gower, Mr. Willis overplays his relationship with Mr. Hoffman. Mr. Hoffman would say he has known Mr. Willis the last four years, but would not be able to tell you what his jobs were.

There was a MDL posting in 2003 with a preferred candidate noted. Mr. Willis applied for the MDL job. Mr. Hoffman did not get Mr. Willis this job, but Mr. Parus might have helped. There was nothing listed for competencies or education on the posting. Mr. Willis took Bob Smith's job because there were a number of issues at the West Plant, minus the ISOM, which was at chemicals.

L. BUL Transition Plan

A template was started a couple of years ago. It lays out the accountability for Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Gower and the BUL. It was initially developed for the BULs. We are now doing it for the BUL's direct reports. The transition plan has a unit section, people section, budget, etc.

M. Contractors

There are four classes of people at TXC and in refining generally (technical, operators, maintenance and contractors). There is too much deference to the union on contractors. The union makes it difficult to bring in contractors because they say the work belongs to them. The union said they will put up signs "no contractors". The contractors are non-union. Texas is essentially a non union state. Essentially, BP union workers are the only union workers. The contractor unions were broken in the 1970s and it was a very contentious time. There is no real union leadership at TXC among BP employees. Union crafts cause more problems against contractors. Most operators would prefer a contract company. Some contractors say things are improving. Zachary (Maintenance)—now if

something is not right, BP will say, how can we fix it. The management team needs a continuous push. Mr. Parus chose his fights carefully with the unions, but the contractor issue was not one of them. Mr. Parus ultimately caused the contractor battle and weakened the team.

N. Major Changes Since March 23, 2005

Trailers were moved;
More exposure of the risk with blow down stacks;
More diligence of operations procedures, such as start-up and shut-down procedures;
Looking at what are superintendents doing;
Carson documented what operational procedures should look like. It may be rudimentary, but it sets the standard. Whiting set up expectations for supervisors.
Toledo records shift disappearances. Carson also had data logs.
Going back to basics, what are our expectations;
HRO assessments for all refineries; the Strong Report; map and track things;
Follow through on Mogford report for each site;
Competencies/training, etc. TXC put every operator through distillation training and operator testing—similar at Whiting and Carson. There was no need at Cherry Point because there were not similar problems. Hourly evaluations were being done at Toledo.
Development of Superintendent Program—Zorka kicked this off. Pilot at Whiting.
Some simulators in place at TXC.

O. Outcome of Assessment

BP disqualified an operator. There was a huge failure rate in distillation training. Part of the problem is everyone is busy. The Baker Panel was set up to survey employees in the plant. We said there were over 1000 expectations issued in refining the past couple of years. But, OSHA punished BP for not meeting one of its minimum requirements. Project Emerald for legal compliance is underway. The issue is whether there is clear direction when relief valves need to be reviewed. BP has a project team working on relief valves. There is a compliance matrix with a software package, but not sure if the document identifies when a valve should be changed. BP did a flare review in the 1990s and made corrections and changes at both TXC and Whiting. However, Mr. Gower is not sure if BP put a good process in place to follow-up.

P. Just Culture

Just culture asks “Did you receive training” and if the answer is no, no discipline for you. You look at training, competencies, etc. If you do this several times, you should have learned and it then escalates to termination. Various factors are looked at. If an employee had training and skill competencies, he/she might be disciplined. TXC had a positive discipline policy. From 2004-2005, TXC disciplined less than a handful of employees. The terminations were for theft and drugs.

Mr. Blyweert asked if there was any philosophy when looking into incidents. Mr. Gower responded that there was no system review of the barrier model at TXC. They would do a root cause analysis of why the instrument failed. Through the hazops process, BP should be doing this. TXC looked at the instrumentation on the towers. There is a differential performance among refineries. TXC is the worse, but Toledo is the worse in recordables.

JMW is working at TXC as part of the OSHA settlement. He has not gotten to the hourly employees at TXC. He is working with the supervisors and doing okay. Mr. Gower does not see any progress in the leadership team.

Q. Global Refinery Leadership Team

Colin Maclean does not report to Mr. Gower or Mr. Hoffman. Mr. Maclean reports to Mr. Browne. Mr. Hoffman is responsible for the Global Refinery Leadership Team. They get together every month to review the same message—review management information, metrics, and refinery performance issues. Mr. Gower does not know if Mr. Manzoni calls Mr. Maclean, but he talks to Iain Conn quite a bit.

Susan Diehl—did well in many roles and is ready to become a band D.

Kathleen Lucas—not enough edge. She is more caring and nurturing and not good for a turnaround. Her MDLs say they are better off pre JDW.

Bill Hagerman—he is referred to as the “iceman”. He is now in an operating role and capable.

Don Harris, new MDL. He was an experienced hire from Mobile. Was a shift director and has a lot of rigor in driving performance. Ran an RSU complex.

Paula Sharp, HR Manager —No influence on the management team. She teaches at Rice University.

Daryl Burtram, Maintenance Manager—he helped on the Stanley Report. He is making a good difference. He makes decisions.

Willy Willis—Mr. Gower is not a big fan. Some think he is a powerful leader.

Joe Barnes—has a different leadership style. He is comfortable talking to outsiders. But, he is not in the group.

Pat King, HSSE Manager—he flushed out his staff. He came back in.

Walt Wundrow, Technical Manager—he is philosophical and strategic, but not tactical. Provides good balance.

Chet Smith, Project Director—he is an abrupt person and was too direct for Al Kozinski. He is back now.

Colin Maclean—good turnaround manager, but abusive to his direct reports. They want him gone.

R. Compliance

Two years ago there were US Compliance Management Requirements. This was a precursor to Emerald. No one signed R&M because it was compliance.

Mr. King is now building the expertise. Mr. Gower did not see the gHSSEr results. He read one on Refining, but did not see the group one. He possibly saw a 2003 summary report. He was not seeing these as part of his job. He wrote the Carson one. Mr. Gower adds that there are not that many gHSSEr audits for refining.

S. Other Interested Parties

Talk to Bill Ralph regarding trailers. Andy McWilliams was the TAR superintendent for the ultra cracker. He was injured, but is back to work. He might have delegated some of the work.

Mr. Gower stated that the MDL should have carried the responsibility for his area. Mr. It is Mr. Gower's belief that Mr. Willis created the confusion. Mr. Willis steps up an employee to reward them, not to be held accountable. Mr. Tenhaaf was a Mr. Willis step-up. Typically, a MDL does not make decisions.

Mr. Gower reiterated that Mr. Parus was the weakest band C he had. Mr. Gower did not think about placing Mr. Parus on a PIP. The issue with Mr. Parus was if you pushed, he would test the wind and would change his course rather than hold strong in his conviction. It was Mr. Parus' view that he was Chairman of the Board. Mr. Gower believes that Mr. Hoffman would have struggled with Mr. Parus' style. Mr. Gower is also not sure if Mr. Hoffman would have selected Mr. Parus. Mr. Parus was told about process safety and failed to act. Mr. Parus had gHSSEr reports and other information.

Mr. Gower added that there were some errors in the start-up procedures, but it could have been brought up safely. Mark Risinger was a Turnaround Superintendent. Why did Mr. Risinger not straighten this out before handling this matter. Maybe this guy might have some accountability.

Mr. Parus points the finger at Mr. Willis.

T. Budget

Mr. Parus asked Mr. Hoffman for a 17% increase in his budget, which was approved. Mr. Gower does not know of any BUL that was beaten up for overspending their budget. At no time did Mr. Parus ever mention that his units were in bad shape. Mr. Parus' biggest issue was infrastructure, tanks, change house, etc.

INTERVIEW CONCLUDED