

BP plc
Baker Panel Conference Call
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Response to the Baker Panel Report

Lord John Browne
Chief Executive, BP plc

I. Preamble

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for coming at such short notice. I am sorry not to be able to join you personally, but I hope you understand that this is a very important day for BP, and I know that Bob Malone, President of BP America, is glad to be with you. I have with me in London John Manzoni, Head of Refining and Marketing, and John Mogford, Head of Safety and Operations. The independent safety review panel chaired by James Baker has now issued its review, giving a thorough assessment of the safety culture and process safety system at our five US refineries. I would like to start by saying a few words before taking questions.

II. Thanks

I would first like to thank the Panel for its work. We asked for a thorough and candid report which would contain not just lessons for us, but for the entire industry. When I established the Panel, Secretary Baker said that he would only take on the task if the chips were to fall where they may, and I agreed with him. I always expected the report to be a hard-hitting and critical analysis, and, indeed, it is. Its mandate was to provide recommendations for improvement. It is for this reason that it is focused on deficiencies and negatives. Indeed, as the Panel states, its report focuses primarily on identified deficiencies that may be corrected through the implementation of its recommendations rather than BP's positive attributes that the Panel observed during the course of its review.

I would also like to thank for their cooperation the hundreds of BP employees who provided material to the Panel or who were interviewed. To the best of my knowledge, this report on a vital aspect of oil and gas operations is unique in its subject matter, breadth and its clarity. Reports like this are important. It will make a difference to BP and to the industry as a whole.

III. The Safety Stool

1. Deficiencies Identified

The Panel said that it was under no illusions that the deficiencies in process safety, culture, management or corporate oversight identified in this report were limited to BP. The report examines every aspect of our process safety regime, and I think we should be open about this. It

identified deficiencies in process safety performance at our US refineries and has called upon us to show the same passion for process safety which BP has shown over many years for personal safety and the environment.

2. Areas of Improvement

As to personal safety, our recordable injury frequency rate, the standard industry measure, fell by around 70% between 2000 and 2006. In 2006, there were seven fatalities in our workforce, and every fatality is a tragedy, but the number of fatalities has reduced to the lowest level in nearly 20 years. There was a large drop in driving-related fatalities, from 11 in 2002 to two in 2006, following the implementation of a new driving standard in 2004. On the environment, we continue to reduce greenhouse gases and improve our products. Greenhouse gas emissions are now around 20% lower than in 2000.

3. More to be Done

However, more remains to be done to put the third leg of the safety stool – process safety management – on the same basis of improvement. Let me be quite clear: BP commits to implementing the Panel's 10 recommendations. BP will now consult with the Panel on how best to do this across our US refineries and apply the lessons learned elsewhere in our global operations. As the report acknowledges, BP has made significant changes to its process safety systems and culture since the accident at Texas City, but we can do more and we will do more. We intend to take the recommendations and consider them very carefully. As the Panel advises, we shall assess their recommendations against the significant actions already planned and underway as we consider our next steps. What is required is not a blizzard of ill-thought-out and conflicting initiatives, but an intelligent and sensibly implementable programme for sustained action. The Panel has recognised that it will be especially challenging to make significant system-wide changes in short time frames. They also recognise that the task ahead for BP is significant and will take a concerted and lasting effort.

4. Lessons to Learn

If I have one thing which I hope you will all hear today, it is this: BP gets it, and I get it, too. This has happened on my watch, and as Chief Executive I have a responsibility to learn from what has occurred. I recognise the need for improvement, and that my successor, Tony Hayward, and I need to take a lead in putting that right by championing process safety as the foundation of BP's operations.

IV. Recommendations

1. Leadership

The Panel's recommendations fall into four categories. First is about leadership, setting direction, expectations, and accountability; having visible conviction; and stepping out by taking an industry-leading position similar to that we have taken on greenhouse gases.

2. Process Safety Management System

Second is about an integrated and comprehensive process safety management system. We have had in place the components of process safety management, implemented well in some refineries and not so well in others. Their view is that our system was insufficient to systematically and continuously identify, reduce and manage risk, and in particular to identify low probability, high consequence risks. The standard to be set is one of excellence: no defects. In particular, they recommend that we monitor the actual on-the-ground implementation of the system with appropriate scrutiny of detail. At the top, we have seen too much aggregated data, and so must improve all our auditing methods and monitor appropriate leading and lagging process safety indicators. In the Panel's view, some new indicators will be needed to be developed for BP and the industry. Whilst the Panel did not believe that the Board failed to comply with their legal duties, it did recommend that the Board engage a third party to provide them with technical input and independent assurance in relation to the implementation of the Panel's recommendations.

3. Knowledge and Expertise

Third is to ensure that the right level of process safety knowledge and expertise is present at every level in the organisation, from the bottom to the top.

4. Transparency in the Organisation

Fourth is to ensure that there is a positive, trusting, open process safety culture in each refinery.

V. Texas City and BP's Response

I met the Panel twice, and in my discussions I acknowledged that BP had fallen short of its high expectations and of the public's expectations of us. We have not always been sufficiently clear on process safety or demonstrated sufficient passion for it. However, 90% of the future will be about what we do and not what we say.

What happened at Texas City was a terrible tragedy. 15 people died and many were injured. When I arrived at the site a few hours after the explosion, I said that we would take responsibility and, above all, that we would work hard to ensure that such an accident never happened again. I said it was a watershed that would forever change BP. That remains true. I will always remember that day vividly. I went to talk to people and to share with them the pain and trauma which they experienced. As I said before, we are truly sorry for what happened.

Cooperating with the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) in its investigations of the incident and agreeing to establish the Baker Panel to review our approach to process safety was an important part of BP's response. I cannot think of an example of another company which has voluntarily submitted itself to this sort of detailed and, frankly, testing scrutiny, which I think shows BP's strength of character. Many of the Panel's recommendations are consistent with the findings of our own internal reviews, and I believe that we have already made significant progress in the early stages of transforming BP into a leader in process safety as the Panel recommends.

VI. Earlier Actions

The actions we are taking date back not only to the Texas City accident in 2005, but some date back to 2003, when we embarked on a major journey to strengthen our operations and systems of internal control following the growth in scale of the Group. These actions also included the strengthening of our safety management systems. As we now recognise, we could have looked at process safety specific issues more rigorously. We will apply the lessons we have learned throughout our international operations. The list of what we have done since the accident shows how seriously we take process safety. We started by developing a six-point plan, including what we call our Texas City commitment to relocate all temporary buildings away from hazardous locations and to remove all heavier than air hydrocarbon blow-down stacks throughout the Group. We have also developed a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive framework for a new operations and safety management system, incorporating our historic framework called 'Getting HSE Right', and we are putting many of the resulting capabilities in place.

We have established a new safety and operations organisation, reporting directly to the Group Chief Executive. We have expanded the responsibilities and powers of Bob Malone, Chairman and President of BP America. We have increased spending to an average of \$1.7 billion over each of the next four years to improve safety and integrity in our US refining assets. The Panel commends that action, which is founded on the historical increase in spending on the five US refineries from 2000 to 2005. Total cash fixed costs are up by almost 10% per annum, and capex is up by 25% per annum. We are very clear: no one from the refinery manager, the Group Vice President of Refining, the Head of the Refining and Marketing business, or I have ever turned down a request for expenditure that has been identified as necessary for safety.

VII. More to Do

The Panel gives us credit for the actions taken to date, but we are under no illusion that there is more to do. This is a matter not just of compliance with laws and regulations – indeed, the Panel did not investigate legal compliance – but it is about setting a standard of excellence and getting there in a sustainable way. I have full confidence in the broader leadership across the BP Group, including John Manzoni as Head of our Refining and Marketing segment, to achieve this.

VIII. Conclusion

In its executive summary, the Panel says that it believes that BP's workforce is ready, willing and able to participate in a sustained group-wide effort to move BP towards excellence in process safety. I wholeheartedly agree, and I would like to make it clear that the tone is being set at the top. As the Panel said, they saw no information to suggest that anyone, from BP's Board members to its hourly workers, acted in anything other than good faith. It is clear, however, with hindsight that we should have done better. Thank you for listening.

Questions and Answers

Loren Steffy, *Houston Chronicle*

What does this report say about your tenure and strategy as CEO? Did the timing of this report have anything to do with your decision to move up your retirement date?

John Browne

This report had nothing to do with my moving up my retirement date. As I told no one at the time, I had concluded in my own mind in early December that I should retire as CEO of BP sooner rather than later. I realised from my business experience that uncertainty is not good for a company or for its employees and that it was time to hand over to a successor. The moment the Board had concluded its long process of choosing my successor, Tony Hayward, I said that I would leave in a period of time which allowed an orderly handover.

This report is about an aspect of BP – process safety management – and an aspect of our activities – the US refineries. As the report makes clear, it was not the absence of process safety management – some refineries were bad, and some were not good – it is the absence of a comprehensive and integrated system of process safety management that is the matter at hand. It is also about leadership ensuring that the tone is set. In other words, safety has three components: personal safety, the environment and process safety management, and we need to make sure that all three legs are handled simultaneously. We need to make the point that process safety management is a foundation of the way we run our operations.

Anne Belli, *Houston Chronicle*

If I heard you correctly, you said that you were not aware of any request from lower levels of the refinery manager all the way up to you for expenditure related to process safety that had been turned down. That is at odds with what we have learned from federal investigators, as well as others who have investigated what has gone on at BP, particularly at Texas City. Are you unaware of any expenditure at all that was turned down for process safety?

John Browne

In the words of the Group Vice President of Refining and the business unit leaders who were interviewed by the Panel, there was no request that was turned down. I certainly did not turn down a request, and neither do I think that John Manzoni turned down a request. Obviously, the way that I look at expenditure is on an aggregated basis, and I leave the details of the sub-allocation of expenditure, in line with the values and principles of the Group, to subsequent levels in the company. Again, I do not think that we found any instance where such expenditure was turned down, and in fact many of the expert groups in BP, even at the time of the merger, had examined the expenditure on HSE generally and found none to be wanting or inappropriately delayed.

TJ Aulds, *Galveston County Daily News*

Folks in Texas City see a lot of the changes you talk about in the town, but, quite frankly, they do not trust you and think that it is a lot of window dressing. You said that the future would be 90%

about what you do instead of what you say. How are you going to mesh those two together, particularly in those communities where the public has an interest in your operations in their town?

John Browne

The Panel has already given very clear recommendations, which we have accepted, which is that the Board should appoint a monitor to examine the implementation of the Baker Panel's findings, that this monitor should report to the Board, and that the Board should make that report available. I agree with what Secretary Baker said in his recent press conference that transparency is very important here to rebuild trust. We have to be transparent and we have to show people what we are doing against the recommendations in the Baker Panel. Of course, we will be consulting, as well. One of the first steps is to take this report, which I have committed to release not only to the public, but also to the workforce, and to discuss it with the workforce and local communities. I hope that will be done as soon as we look at the details in the report to get an implementation plan together. As you say, it is actions that speak louder than words.

Jessica Resnick-Ault, Dow Jones Newswires

BP has maintained that the company's problems at Texas City were not indicative of wider systemic problems. The report seems to find differently and says that the problems are present not only in the refinery system, but that at a very high level a culture of safety is absent. Do you still maintain that the problems are not systemic?

John Browne

Our conclusions at that point were based upon the investigations into Texas City, which clearly looked like an outlier at the time, and indeed in the analysis of many of the factors the Panel have analysed, it remains somewhat of an outlier. Secondly, in the words of the Panel in their first conference, all the refineries were different: some were good, and some were not so good. What we have concluded from the Panel, and we accept their recommendation, is that going forward we need to ensure a comprehensive, integrated system for process safety management. I think that is important.

Secondly, they did not find, and neither did we conclude, that we lacked a safety culture. We did not lack a safety culture; we had a very strong culture in personal safety, and I think the improvement there has been significant. However, we found that the process safety management culture in each of the five refineries was actually different. They have different backgrounds and they have different heritages. I think it also reinforces Dr Rosenthal's conclusion at the press conference that culture takes a very long time to change, and it is only six years since these refineries variously became part of the BP Group. There will be a requirement for a consistent, long-term – and I think one of the Panel members said that 'long-term' means 'forever' – attention to the culture to get the process safety management culture instilled from top to bottom in the company.

Andrew Clark, *Guardian*

The report contains some personal criticism of you. It says that if you had shown the same leadership in process safety as you have done in the environment then BP's refineries would be safer. To what extent do you accept that personal criticism? How much responsibility do you personally take for what happened at Texas City?

John Browne

I take the comment and I have learned from it. That is very important in that a balanced approach to the different components of safety – personal safety, environmental safety and process safety – needs to be struck. I repeat again that as Chief Executive I have a responsibility to implement these findings, to learn and to improve the future, and that is what I, the Board and the company have committed to do.

Bruce Nichols, Reuters

What does this do to your legacy, which is otherwise a successful legacy? You have had these problems recently in several different areas of the company.

John Browne

My focus as Group Chief Executive of BP is about BP as a whole, which is nothing to do with me. Insofar as I am Group Chief Executive... [loss of audio] ...that is what I will look at and make sure that everything can be done to keep doing that job and having a very orderly and appropriate handover to my successor, Tony Hayward. There will be times and places to examine legacy and other things, but that is not for me to say. However, BP is a very different company than it was when I took over as Chief Executive from David Simon in 1995. On most factors and measures, we have grown very significantly, by over 250%. The company has become global as a multi-regional company, and we have plenty of places where we produce oil, we produce over 100,000 barrels per day when it used to be three, and production has grown very significantly. Financial and operating factors, as I say, have all expanded well north of 250%. All of this needs to be reflected by others and not me. I repeat again that my priority at the moment is to be Group Chief Executive of BP for the remaining part of my tenure, to have an orderly handover, and to think about the Group first, and that is what I intend to do.

John Deere[?], Dow Jones Newswires

Looking back over the last 6-12 months, is there anything you would have done differently with any of these issues, either Texas City or the overall safety management?

John Browne

Over the last 6-12 months we have been very active. Almost immediately after the Texas City incident, we commissioned our own investigation into Texas City by John Mogford, and we began the implementation in a very considered way of a large number of things to begin to improve our process safety management systems across the world. I am pleased that we did that, and it has certainly accelerated over the last 6-12 months. We have been very clear about the priority which must be attached to this, and I have done that by visiting all of the refineries in many parts of the world, making the point that process safety management is a core part of BP, and we need to demonstrate that by doing the right thing. So, I can look back and say that of course there are things I could do differently, but I think the most productive thing to say, attaching to the Baker Panel, I believe we did all we could do reasonably with the workforce, without extending them or stretching them to the point of impossibility or confusing with lots of initiatives and ill-thought-out actions. We have done what I believe we can do, and we intend to do very much more.

Sheila McNulty, *The Financial Times*

Back in the late 1990s, there were a number of workers in Alaska who wrote you personally a letter to tell you about the safety problems, inadequate funding problems, and so on at BP. [Loss of audio] ... considered a local management issue. Do you now feel that you personally let staff down in failing to recognise this letter and other red flags that came your way over the years?

John Browne

It is easy to look in retrospect and say that the sum total of all things means something different when you look at it from a distance. As we operated at the time, none of these letters were left unattended. They were examined by the management of the Exploration and Production segment globally and by the local management, and actions were taken.

Sheila McNulty

Do you personally feel that you let staff down in any way?

John Browne

I think I have a deep and moral responsibility for this company, and in that moral responsibility I always feel that when anything goes wrong, that I have let the staff down. I believe that is a moral responsibility of any leader.

Laurel Calkins, Bloomberg News

A moment ago you said you had done all that you can do and that you will do more, but based on some information that has come out about an ongoing safety audit at the Texas City refinery, the units are still failing the safety audits on things like basic mechanical integrity inspections. That is something the Baker report identified as a weakness: a failure to identify core weaknesses and find solutions. How quickly can you move to do all you can and do more? Given the fact that these units are still failing inspections, and yet they are running, how can you say that the refinery is safe?

John Manzoni

As John has outlined, our response to this report is a long-term journey. For at least 18 months we have had actions in place which are entirely consistent with many of the recommendations on the report. We have made great progress over that time, and I fully expect that we can now take all of the detailed recommendations in the report and make further progress. I do not know the specifics of the particular inspections to which you are referring, but I think that as we bring up Texas City and re-commission that plant, we are taking exceptional care and conducting special inspections in engineering studies to make sure that each of those units as they come up are fit for their duty. Indeed, there is a new standard of care, largely due to the incident just a few years ago. I think what you are referring to is our normal process of bringing in and re-commissioning Texas City where we are taking all of that care. As soon as those inspections find issues, we are actually bringing the plant back down again in order to fix them fully and quickly so that we can safely re-commission Texas City. Indeed, it is about half up now and has been re-commissioned safely up to this point, and we are very pleased with the progress, but we must take exceptional care as we go forward.

I would add that as part of our ongoing action, which, indeed, is highlighted as part of the report, we must attend to overdue inspections. This is a historical backlog, and for any of those overdue inspections we have full programmes in place to do, which are improving and reducing all of the time. I think these are the inspections to which you must be referring, but I am afraid I do not have the detail.

Bob Malone

If I could add a personal response to that, I have had the opportunity now to visit Texas City on four or five occasions, and I have met with management and the workforce. The one consistent message that I hear is pride in the progress that is being made, pride in the culture change that is occurring, and, as many have said because they want this message out there, that they feel entirely comfortable with shutting down units that they believe pose an integrity risk. They take great pride in giving examples where they have done so. As we bring in a process safety culture and as the culture change process continues in our refining, these are the kinds of things you want to happen. These are good things. People are taking down the units because they are unsure of the safety or integrity, or maybe that they are looking at the process they are going through, and there may be a gap. I take that as a positive, and our employees in Texas City do, as well.

Jeff Kralowetz, Argus Media

You said there is not going to be a blizzard or flurry of quick activity or ill-thought-out responses to the Baker Report. How quickly will BP be able to move forward with this independent monitoring group, how do you see that being comprised, and will that happen during your tenure?

John Browne

It is too early to tell. The Panel recommends that we should take a steady and considered approach to all their recommendations, and we will do so. This one is particularly for the Board. It is an independent monitor reporting independently to the Board. While my team and I will be advising the independent directors about this, I believe they have the ultimate say-so. It would seem to me that time spent in consideration and careful selection, along with the terms of reference of this monitor, will be paid for well. The time taken to get it right, I believe, is appropriate.

I cannot comment on the time. We are looking at all the detailed recommendations, which we have not had for very long. We need to lay out the recommendations against what we are doing at the moment, examine gaps and carefully consider how those gaps will be filled and over what timescale. We cannot comment on that at the moment.

Anne Belli

Since 23 March 2005, we have had a lot of feedback in the form of reports and individual interviews with workers in Texas City and elsewhere that BP upper management in London put profits and production above personal safety. I would ask you to respond to that first.

Secondly, I have heard what you have said today and you have acknowledged that upper management did focus more on personal safety than process safety. Is that not a mammoth mistake, given the extent and operations of what refineries do and what happens there, that process safety is

the sort of safety that blows up refineries, as one source told me? Just how big of an oversight has it been that BP has put personal safety above process safety?

John Browne

Firstly, we have never focused on profits above safety; safety has always come first. I think that is very important. Secondly, on process safety, we had many indicators, all of which were giving us positive feedback. The point I was making is that we have never clearly expressed what the Panel recommends we should express, which is to make process safety equal to the other two dimensions of safety that we have focused on, and we have said we will implement this recommendation. It is not that we have not focused on process safety; we have. We had a safety management system in place called Getting HSE Right; it has been in place for a long time. We also put in place process safety standards, which were revised in 2001. The list goes on.

I think the point the Panel is making is that they are providing us best-practice input on process safety. That is the important point. This is about getting to a state of excellence. It is not as if we had not focused on process safety; I think in their view it was not excellent enough. The standard here is excellent.

Bob Malone

I can add to John's comment as someone who has run operations in BP for 32 years. Whether it is the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, manufacturing operations or shipping companies, in all those businesses we had indicators that you may call integrity management. In the refining business you refer to that as process safety, but we had integrity standards at business-unit level. You measured integrity or process safety, and you also measured your individual safety.

As John mentioned, what the Panel has talked a lot about, and I need to get deeper into the report, is when you begin to aggregate that, we believe the indicators for individual safety gave us a view of process safety. As you heard the Panel say, and John comment on, they recognise that each one of our refineries had a process-safety management system. However, the real question we are raising is about integrating the same standards so that it is a BP refining system consistent throughout. It is not the absence of process safety or integrity management.

Participant

Over the past two years or so, we have seen BP have a number of problems, not only Texas City but also Alaska, with the Thunderhorse project and some of the trading issues. A lot of people on the inside have attributed this to a deficient culture at the company. You have said all along that you do not think that is so, that each problem is individual. Do you still feel that way? Do you still feel that each of these should be taken on its own terms, or do you acknowledge that there is some larger problem? If there is not, how do you account for that at a time when all the other companies have not had comparable problems, or at least not so many of them?

John Browne

We still believe they are all quite different. They all occurred at different levels in the organisation, with different subject matter and different circumstances. We believe that. I think we have been in different forms than the other companies. Thunderhorse, for example, is a unique project which is

pushing the frontiers of technology. The unfortunate nature of the impact of evacuation as the large number of hurricanes approached Thunderhorse and the consequent metallurgic problems is something quite different to what has happened in Texas City.

Andrew Clark

This is a question for Mr Manzoni. Lawyers from the victims of the Texas City disaster have called for you to stand down, given the deficiencies that have been exposed on your watch. Do you think it would be appropriate for you to resign?

John Manzoni

No, I am not planning to resign. I am committed to lead the programme that has been underway for some 18 or 20 months in the refining system, which indeed can now be enhanced by virtue of the recommendations of this report. I have learned an enormous amount personally from what has happened at Texas City, and I think we have taken many actions not only in Texas City but across our refining system in the US, which have improved the process safety, reduced the risk and therefore improved the personal safety of every individual who goes to those refineries. I am committed to that journey. I am committed to it for the long term, and I therefore believe I have a lot to add to that. So, I am not planning to resign.

Participant

Lord Browne, the Committee has undertaken an accountability review. Where are you in terms of that review, and what actions do you plan to take based on the initial or preliminary findings of that review as of right now?

John Browne

I have not seen the conclusions of our disciplinary review. When these conclusions are formed, I expect we will take action on them. I think it would be inappropriate to comment further.

TJ Aulds

Mr Malone, this may be most relevant to you. Roughly over the last decade, local management of the Texas City refinery has turned over at a rate of six or seven refinery managers at last count, with a new one coming on board this week. It has been mentioned by some members of the Baker Panel and more widely that the consistent message of process safety or safety across the board gets lost because every time someone new comes in, there seems to be a new focus. What will you do to be able to address that?

Bob Malone

We recognise that management turnover is an issue for us. The good thing about this is that you bring in fresh eyes, which is the positive part. The negative part is that you do not form the relationships that you need at the working level. With the idea of a standard process-safety management system, consistent across all our refineries, the parameters, the objectives and the goals are sustainable well beyond the movement of an individual refinery manager or operating superintendent. You want to get the infrastructure in place and the process embedded in the

organisation as part of the culture. Then, it is less dependent on the movement of leadership in a refinery or in any of our operations.

John Manzoni

I fully agree with what Bob has said. I would add that our expectation from this point forward is that our business-unit leaders in the refineries will stay in place at least three years, and preferably five years, at a time.

Laurel Calkins

Several weeks ago, Mr Hoffman said he would resign in the spring, and, Lord Browne, you have also now decided to leave ahead of your planned schedule. There is much speculation that these exits from the company result either from the Baker Study findings or the internal accountability study. Can you tell us whether those studies have had an impact on Mr Hoffman's exit or your exit, and can we see more executives heading for the door as a result of these studies?

John Browne

I can only tell you what Mr Hoffman told me and said in a public statement: it was his wish to retire. That is what I believe to be the case. In my own case, I have already explained the decision making in my answer to an earlier question, and I will not repeat this but I will give you the bare bones. In early December I had made up in my own mind, but of course did not tell anyone, that it was time for me to change when a successor was selected by the Board. The Board was not quite through its process in its selection process, which was a very thorough and extremely diligent selection process, examining all the potential candidates, talking to many people, and seeking my own views, also. When that process was reaching conclusion, I then indicated that I felt it was appropriate in order to clear up uncertainty. In my business experience, uncertainty is not good in a company for the market or the public, and also internally for the workforce at large. To clear up that uncertainty, I indicated we should make an announcement very quickly of my successor – a great successor and a really good person, Tony Hayward – and to have an appropriate hand-over period so we could manage the change appropriately. That is what happened.

Participant

Given the need that BP has expressed to improve its performance in this area, I am curious why Mr Hayward is not present to deliver that message. Does that say anything about the company's commitment to these issues going forward that the new CEO is not there to accept the mantle on this occasion?

John Browne

It says nothing at all. Mr Hayward has another very long-standing engagement. Obviously he was not aware of his appointment until it was made, and that is very important indeed. Tony will be with the Baker Panel next week to talk to them. I have talked to him about every conclusion we have come to. He has, of course, been a member of the Board for many years, and therefore has participated in discussion not just on his particular responsibilities, presently Exploration and Production, but also on all the wider matters of the Group. He is fully familiar with this, and I am speaking to you not as John Browne but as Group Chief Executive of BP on behalf of BP, and I will

continue to do that while I am Group Chief Executive. Of course everything will be discussed and Tony and I, who have a very good relationship, will be working very closely with each other. We will be doing many things together.

Bob Malone

John, thank you for joining us today, and with that we will conclude the press conference.

John Browne

Thank you, Bob. Good afternoon.

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